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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Food aid has played a useful role in Government of Bangladesh efforts to 
increase food security in the last three decades, adding to foodgrain availability, 
supplying wheat for targeted distribution to poor households, and helping to 
finance development projects and programs.   However, sustained increases in 
domestic production of both rice and wheat have increased the likelihood of 
disincentive effects arising from continued large inflows of food aid.  
The analysis shows that if good rice harvests continue so that real rice 
prices remain at their levels of 2000, and if international wheat prices return to 
their average 1995-99 levels, then public wheat distribution may need to be cut 
to levels below the current amount of food aid received (650 thousand tons in 
2000/2001) to avoid reducing domestic prices below import parity.   
However, resources will continue to be required for programs that 
increase access to food by the poor, contribute to increased utilization of food 
and result in improved nutritional outcomes, even if the need for food aid to 
increase availability of foodgrains diminishes.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Food aid, (aid supplied as food commodities on grant or concessional 
terms),
1 has played a very large and useful role in Government of Bangladesh 
efforts to increase food security in the last three decades.  At the national level, 
food aid has added to foodgrain availability, helping to reduce the “food gap” 
between foodgrain consumption needs and supply from domestic production.  And 
at the household level, food aid targeted to poor households has increased their 
access to food.  Resources from food aid also have helped successful 
development projects and programs in Bangladesh and many other developing 
countries (Singer et al., 1987, Clay and Stokke, 1991, Ruttan, 1993).   
However, food aid’s share of total foodgrain availability in Bangladesh has 
fallen during the last two decades, in large part because of sustained increases in 
domestic production of both rice and wheat.
 2  Moreover, bumper crops in 
1999/2000 and 2000/2001 eliminated the calculated “food gap”, calculated as the 
difference between foodgrain needed for a target level of food consumption (454 
grams/person/day) and net domestic production (which includes a 10 percent 
deduction for seed, feed and wastage), (Figure 1).  These increases in domestic 
                                                 
1 Food aid includes donations of food commodities by governments, intergovernmental 
organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), and private voluntary and non-
governmental organizations, monetary grants tied to food purchases, and sales and loans of food 
commodities on credit terms with a repayment period of three years or more (FAO, 1980). 
2 There are important exceptions to this long-term trend of diminishing importance of food aid, 
however, such as in 1998, when food aid levels were substantially increased following major floods 
that severely damaged the aman rice crop.       2 
 
production have also reduced market demand for food grain imports and 
increased the likelihood of price disincentive effects arising from continued large 
inflows of food aid.  Given the disappearance of the food gap, the relatively high 
cost of delivery of food aid and possible price disincentive effects on domestic 
production, food aid donors have begun to reconsider their use of food aid as a 
tool to enhance food security in Bangladesh and may choose to reduce their levels 
of food aid in the future.
3   
Adverse impacts on domestic producer prices of wheat are not the only 
possible disincentive effects of food aid.  Over the medium-term, food aid can 
enable countries to neglect their domestic agriculture through inadequate lower 
public investment in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension, as 
well as price and trade policies biased against the agricultural sector.  Food aid 
supported projects can also potentially distort local labor markets.  This paper, 
however, focuses mainly on price disincentives because increases in domestic 
production of rice and wheat and a return of world wheat prices to their medium-
term average levels are likely to make price disincentive effects of food aid a 
continuing food policy concern for the Government of Bangladesh and food aid 
donors.   
In analyzing price disincentives of food aid, we employ a simple partial 
equilibrium model of the wheat sector in Bangladesh, extending the earlier 
                                                 
3 The European Union has already taken this step, as part of its global food security strategy, and 
has planned to end food aid to Bangladesh by 2003, replacing it with cash-based programs for food 
security.  Moreover, a U.S. statute requires USAID to conduct an annual Bellmon Determination 
(named after a U.S. Congressman) to certify that its food aid is not creating disincentives to 
production in the recipient country (see Atwood et. al, 2000; p. 153).     3 
 
analyses by the Centre for International Economics (1997), Dorosh and 
Haggblade (1998) and Dorosh (2000) by explicitly taking into account the 
difference between local soft white wheat and imported high-gluten “milling” wheat.  
The analysis also includes implications of changes in rice prices and marginal 
propensities to consume (MPC’s) wheat out of direct food transfers  than MPC’s 
for cash incomes.
4   
In Section 2, we present an overview of food aid policies, programs and 
trends from a global perspective.  Section 3 discusses food aid in Bangladesh, 
providing a brief history, a description of food-assisted programs, and data on 
levels, composition and trends in food aid and public foodgrain distribution.  
Section 4 contains an analysis of the impact of food aid on market prices, imports 
and domestic production.  Conclusions and policy implications are presented in 
Section 5. 
                                                 
4 Dorosh and Haggblade (1998) also included alternative marginal propensities to consume wheat 
in transfer programs and explicit modeling of the rice sector in their multi-market model, but did not 
differentiate among different qualities of wheat.   4 
 
2.  GLOBAL FOOD AID FLOWS AND PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
Food aid programs have been a major part of development assistance 
since the middle of the 20
th century.  Following World War II, food aid was included 
in U.S. rehabilitation efforts in Western Europe and gradually used in relief and 
development assistance by more donors and to more recipients.  Over time, the 
geographical focus, levels and objectives of food aid have evolved, driven in part 
by agricultural and trade policies in donor countries, ever-changing conditions in 
recipient countries and shifting development paradigms.
5   
 
 
 
  Trends in the Volume of Food Aid 
 
 
Over the past three decades, total global food aid deliveries averaged 10.1 
million tons per year,
6 but fluctuated sharply in the 1990s based mainly on supply 
factors, (especially changes in domestic production subsidies), in donor countries 
(Figure 2).  Total food aid flows peaked in 1992/93 at 15.2 million tons, but then 
declined steeply to only 5.6 million tons in 1996/97 as U.S. contributions fell from 
8.5 to 2.3 million tons in the same period.  Total food aid again increased in 
1998/99 and 1999/2000 to over 10 million tons each year, with the U.S. 
contributing about 60 percent of the total, similar to its average over the past two 
decades (Table 1).   
                                                 
5 See Shaw and Clay (1993) for an overview of the history of food aid and Atwood, Jahangir, Smith 
and Kabir (2000) for a review of food aid in Bangladesh.   
6 1971/72-1998/99, calculated from FAO/INTERFEIS data.   5 
 
Donors of food aid can be grouped into several broad categories.  First, the 
agricultural exporters – the United States, Canada, Australia and the European 
Community – became food aid providers as a way of utilizing surpluses for a 
mixture of developmental, humanitarian, foreign policy and domestic agricultural 
policy and trade objectives.
7  Other donors, that are not major agricultural 
exporters, have historically seen themselves as providing finance for food as part 
of the international commitment to humanitarian relief and developmental 
assistance under FAC or to multilateral programmes and the work of voluntary 
agencies.  Historically, the latter group has shown more flexibility in resourcing, 
contributing relatively more to meeting the non-commodity costs of food aid. 
 
 
 
Geographical Focus  
 
 
The geographical focus of food aid has also shifted.  From the 1970’s to the 
early 1990’s, there was a substantial shift in focus of food aid flows away from 
South Asia and towards Africa.  As India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have exploited 
the technological opportunities of the Green Revolution and moved towards self-
sufficiency in basic food staples, food aid flows to these countries have declined.  
In contrast, because agriculture has stagnated in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
food deficits have increased along with high population growth (Shaw and Clay, 
1993).   
                                                 
7 Diven (2001) provides econometric evidence that the volume of U.S. food aid from 1954 to 1991 
was driven mainly by producer interests in the U.S. (levels of stocks and exports) and not by 
production shortfalls in developing countries.    6 
 
During the 1990s, Bangladesh was the largest recipient of food aid, 
receiving an average of 868 thousand tons per year, 7.2 percent of the total (Table 
2).  The next three largest recipients were all in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia (6.2 
percent), Egypt (3.8 percent), and Mozambique (3.2 percent), with the region as a 
whole receiving 30.7 percent of the total.   
 
Composition of Food Aid 
 
 
Globally, most food aid is in the form of wheat, though the composition of 
food aid has also fluctuated along with the total volume of aid and the source of 
food aid (Table 3).  Wheat and wheat flour accounted for about 70 percent of food 
aid in the 1970s, 66 percent in the 1980s and only 53 percent in the 1990s.  Wheat 
food aid was on average only around 3.0 percent of developed countries’ wheat 
production over the three decades, however.  Increases in the share of non-cereal 
food aid, from a mere 1.70 percent during the 1970’s to about 11.50 percent in the 
1990’s account for much of the difference in wheat’s share.  In Bangladesh, food 
aid is almost exclusively in the form of wheat; only small amounts of rice and 
vegetable oil are received as food aid.  
 
Food Aid Programs 
 
 
Food aid delivery mechanisms and programs have varied widely across 
countries and over time, including direct distribution of food aid commodities, 
monetization, triangular transactions, local purchase and exchange arrangements.    7 
 
In Bangladesh, most food aid is channeled into the public foodgrain distribution 
system.  Neither tri-angular transactions (donor acquisition of food aid 
commodities in a third country for delivery to the recipient country) nor local 
purchases have been used in Bangladesh on a major scale.   
 
Disincentive Effects of Food Aid 
 
 
Food aid has often been criticized for its potential to create disincentives for 
domestic production and distort domestic food economies.  Where food aid adds 
to the total imports (and food supply) of a country, it can lower local food prices, 
thereby discouraging local production.  In the longer term, food aid may lead to 
changed food habits and demand for imported goods.  The availability of food aid 
may also create a dependency mentality and reduce incentives for public 
investment by enabling recipient governments to neglect local agriculture and 
long-term food security.  Finally, on a more micro-level, food aid projects may 
distort local labor markets by attracting workers away from vital activities during 
the agricultural year.  (See Maxwell and Singer, 1979). 
Where cereal food aid simply replaces commercial imports, at least in non-
emergency situations, it cannot be held responsible for disincentive effects that 
would have occurred in any case as a result of commercial imports.  More 
generally, the extent of disincentives is, in practice, determined by the way in 
which food aid is used.  Appropriate policies and precautions, including demand 
expansion, price support to producers and differentiated markets to increase 
consumption, can help to reduce or avoid disincentive effects (Cathie, 1991;   8 
 
Maxwell and Singer, 1991; Clay and Stokke 1991; Singer et al, 1987).  For 
example, additional consumption can be stimulated directly, by distributing food to 
hungry people or indirectly, by increasing expenditure on poverty alleviation 
programs.
8 
Historically, appropriate government policies and rapid technological 
change in agriculture enabled India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to increase food 
production dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s, even with substantial flows of 
food aid (Shaw and Clay, 1993). 
 
Program Costs  -- The Cash versus In-Kind Debate 
 
 
The simplest way to avoid disincentive effects of food aid on domestic 
production is to use cash rather than food aid to increase access to food by poor 
households.  Aid in cash avoids high costs of international transport (often 
specified to be on vessels registered in the donor country), as well as domestic 
transport of commodities from the port to the distribution center.  Though monetary 
aid does not directly increase availability of food, it can provide the foreign 
exchange resources to permit an expansion of government or private sector 
imports.  Proponents of food aid also argue that leakages may be higher with cash 
as opposed to direct food transfers, though no conclusive empirical evidence 
exists to test this hypothesis.   
                                                 
8 Note, however, that programs to increase demand for food are unlikely to completely offset the 
increase in supply of food due to food aid.  See Dorosh and Haggblade (1997) and del Ninno and 
Dorosh (2001).     9 
 
Monetization of food aid through sales to the government or private traders 
at a major port augments domestic supply and avoids high internal domestic 
transport costs.  Where food aid is distributed in regions of a country that are net 
exporters of the commodity, (as is the case of Food For Work transfers in much of 
rural Bangladesh), cash transfers are more efficient than in-kind transfers 
(assuming that leakages are not greater with cash transfers).
9  
                                                 
9  See Coate (1989) and  Dorosh and Haggblade (1997).   10 
 
 
3.  FOOD AID POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH 
 
 
Food aid to Bangladesh has declined over time, from an average of about 
1.2 million tons per year in the 1970s and 1980s to only about 600 thousand tons 
by the end of the 1990s.   During the 1970s and 1980s, Bangladesh was one of 
the world’s largest recipients of food aid, receiving on average about 1.2 million 
tons per year.  The value of food aid peaked during the 1980s, and food aid 
averaged 18.3 billion (2000) Taka in real terms in the first five years of the decade, 
equal to 22.1 percent of total aid, 11.6 percent of government expenditures and 
10.9 percent of total imports (Table 4).   
However, food aid in Bangladesh fell sharply (by an average rate of 5.95 
percent per year in quantity terms) during the negotiation period of the Uruguay 
round (1985/86-1993/94).  In value terms, average food aid from 1989/90 through 
1993/94 was only about half that of 1979/80-1983/84.  It declined even further to 
an annual average of only 6.3 billion (2000) Taka from 1994/95 through 
1999/2000, one third of its total fifteen years earlier.  Moreover, as total 
government expenditures and external trade increased, food aid’s importance in 
the fiscal balance and the balance of payments dramatically shrunk.  In 1983/84 
food accounted for 21.8 percent of total aid, 11.6 percent of government 
expenditures and 11.7 percent of the value of imports.  By 1997/98, these shares 
had fallen to 7.9 percent, 1.7 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively (Figure 3).   
Nonetheless, in quantity terms, the trend in food aid was slightly positive in 
the late 1990s due to the large increase in emergency food aid to Bangladesh   11 
 
following the flood of 1998.  Normal food aid flows during the late 1990s were only 
about 600 thousand tons per year, however (Figure 4). 
 
Uses of Food Aid 
 
 
Uses of food aid in Bangladesh have also changed over time.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s, much of the food aid was sold at subsidized prices through the Public 
Foodgrain Distribution System (PFDS).
10  Initially, counterpart funds generated by 
the sale of food were used for general public expenditures, but beginning in the 
mid-1980s, (check USAID PL480 Title III), donors gradually introduced conditions 
for the use of counterpart funds, stipulating that they be used for jointly agreed 
projects.  In the peak years of food distribution and food aid, from 1986/87 through 
1991/92, food aid averaged 1.4 million tons per year and accounted for nearly 60 
percent of average total public distribution of 2.4 million tons.   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, major reforms were initiated in the food-
assisted programs in Bangladesh to improve targeting of subsidies and reduce 
leakages.  In the sales channels, prices were gradually raised to levels close to 
market prices, reducing the subsidy and making these channels less attractive for 
their beneficiaries.  Ultimately, both Statutory Rationing (in urban areas) and Palli 
Rationing (in rural areas) were terminated in the early 1990s, and a new major 
targeted channel, Food for Education, was introduced in 1993.   
                                                 
10 The PFDS has two major types of channels: sales channels, including Open Market Sales, 
where recipients pay a subsidized price for the commodities, and non-sales channels (such as 
Food For Work and relief channels) in which recipients do not purchase the food.   12 
 
The Food For Work (FFW) program also underwent serious reforms after a 
joint Government of Bangladesh and donor task force, (The Strengthening of 
Institutions of Food-Assisted Development or SIFAD task force) raised questions 
about the utility, quality and desirability of the already created structures under 
FFW.  Following the recommendation, the World Food Programme (WFP) moved 
away from its previous scheme based approach to a project based approach, with 
the selection of projects made through a rigorous selection criteria and improved 
quality of construction.  Food for Work paid out of donor resources was renamed 
as RD (Rural Development), and a cash component was introduced as part of the 
labor wage, to be paid out of the Government of Bangladesh contribution.  FFW 
(RD) components implemented by CARE started using cash as its focus shifted 
from earthwork to create structures on roads, including culverts to facilitate safe 
flow of water.   
As donors gradually withdrew direct support for so-called local initiative 
FFW programs from the late 1980s, the Government of Bangladesh began to 
provide its own resources to fund various programs.  By the late 1990s, average 
annual food aid inflows were only about 600 thousand tons (a decline of about 800 
thousand tons from the late 1980s), and food aid accounted for only about one-
third of total PFDS distribution of about 1.8 million tons per year (Table 5 and 
Figure 5).  Distribution of grain from non-food aid resources (i.e. GOB-own 
resources) rose to about 1.2 million tons per year, up by about 200 thousand tons 
from the late 1980s.   
The net result of the elimination of major non-targeted sales channels, 
initiation of the Food For Education program, and the decline in food aid, was a   13 
 
smaller, better-targeted PFDS.  The share of the public foodgrain distribution 
through programs targeted to the poor increased from 39.4 percent in 1992 to 84.7 
percent in 1999/2000 (Figure 6).   
Further reductions in food aid and perhaps the size of the PFDS are likely 
because of the European Union’s decision to phase out food aid to Bangladesh by 
2003, unless other donors increase their volume of aid or the GOB increases its 
expenditures for the PFDS.        14 
 
 
4.  RICE DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS OF FOOD AID IN BANGLADESH 
 
 
Since food aid ultimately increases market supply of wheat, it has the 
potential to lower domestic wheat prices and adversely affect incentives for 
domestic wheat production and incomes of wheat farmers.  Whether food aid 
actually lowers market prices, however, depends on whether food aid is simply 
replacing public or private imports, or whether food aid is actually increasing total 
domestic supply of wheat.  In other words, in order to avoid depressing market 
prices below import parity prices, the total level of food aid must not exceed the 
amount of wheat that would be imported by the private sector under free trade in 
the absence of food aid.  
Note that in the discussion that follows, it is assumed that wheat food aid 
results in a corresponding distribution of wheat through the Public Foodgrain 
Distribution System, i.e. that there is no change in public stocks.  Note also that in 
terms of impact on market prices and private imports, food aid has the same effect 
as public commercial imports distributed through the PFDS, though of course 
public commercial imports are purchased with the GOB’s own resources, not 
donor finances.   
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of food aid on domestic prices and private 
sector imports.  Food aid adds to domestic supply of wheat, shifting the supply 
curve from S0 to S’.  In the absence of private sector trade, total supply equals 
total demand at a price of P1.  However, if the world price PM (import parity) is   15 
 
below P1, then there will be private imports equal to M1, in addition to food aid 
(F1). 
Moreover, as long as food aid is less than or equal to the level of private 
sector imports that would be imported in the absence of food aid (M1 plus F1), 
then food aid has no disincentive effects on domestic production, since domestic 
market prices will be equal to import parity (PM).  However, in comparison to a 
higher, long-term import parity price of PM’, food aid may cause disincentive 
effects even when there are private sector imports (Figure 7).  At the import parity 
price of PM’, domestic production would be S2 in the absence of food aid, 
compared with only S3, with food aid. 
The import parity price in any given year could be higher than the long-term 
average import parity price, as well.  In this case, even though food aid reduces 
domestic producer prices below import parity and has a disincentive effect on 
domestic production, domestic prices would still be high in comparison with other 
years.  Since excessively high prices can have a serious negative impact on 
access to food by poor households, price stabilization is one of the major 
objectives of food policy of the Government of Bangladesh.  Thus, rather than 
using the current import parity price, it is more appropriate to compare domestic 
prices with a reference price calculated on the basis of medium-term average of 
world prices, (though the exact definition of this reference price is subject to 
debate).  
The basic analytical framework described above focuses on the import 
parity price of wheat and the short-run response of consumers and producers to 
changes in the wheat price, holding other factors constant.  But other factors,   16 
 
which influence the shape and location of the domestic supply curve for wheat, the 
shape and location of the domestic supply and demand curves for wheat must 
also be taken into account.    Domestic supply is determined not only by 
farmers’expected price of wheat during the growing season, but also by the 
expected prices of alternative crops, expected yields, available production 
technologies, weather,  prices and availability of inputs.  Domestic demand is 
determined by the responsiveness of consumers to changes in the wheat price 
(reflected in the shape of the demand curve), as well as the prices of other goods 
(most importantly, rice) and the level and distribution of household incomes (both 
of which shift the demand curve to the right or left).  Other factors also influence 
total demand including demand for wheat as animal feed and the amount of wheat 
distributed through programs targeted to poor women and children. 
The impacts of reductions in demand for wheat on domestic prices, 
production and imports are shown in Figure 8.  In years of a good rice harvest, 
demand for wheat in Bangladesh falls as consumers choose to consume more rice 
and less wheat.  A shift in the demand curve from D0 to D’ reduces total private 
sector imports to M2, but domestic prices remain equal to the import parity level 
PM.  However, an even larger shift in domestic demand to D’’ leads to an excess 
of supply over demand at the import parity price PM.  As a result, the domestic 
price drops to P3 and private sector imports cease.  In this case, a level of food aid 
that did not lead to price disincentive effects with a normal level of demand (D0), 
caused prices to fall below import parity levels when demand fell to D’’. 
Two other factors are particularly important.  First, there are major quality 
differences for wheat.  Domestically produced wheat is soft wheat with a relatively   17 
 
low gluten content, and is not suitable for many baking purposes (biscuits, cakes, 
and many types of breads).  To meet the demand for these products, wheat millers 
use imported wheat with higher gluten content (so-called milling wheat).  
Discussions with a large international grain company representative indicate that 
roughly 30 thousand tons of milling wheat per month is used in Bangladesh, 
totalling about 360 thousand tons per year.  Thus, private sector imports of wheat 
of comparable quality to Bangladesh wheat in 1999/2000 were about 540 
thousand tons, (360 thousand tons less than the total 806 thousand tons of private 
sector wheat imports).    
Second, the Bangladesh wheat harvest is concentrated in a few months 
(March-April), and that the bulk of Food For Work wheat distribution typically 
occurs from January through May (when soils are dry enough to permit heavy 
earthwork for road-building and repair), there are potentially large seasonal effects 
of PFDS distribution.    Spreading the distribution of wheat throughout the year 
through other channels (such as Food For Education), is one means of minimizing 
the risk of depressing market prices to the detriment of producers.    
 
 
 
Border Prices and Private Sector Imports 
 
 
For much of the last three years, private sector imports have been 
substantial and Bangladesh domestic prices for wheat have closely tracked import 
parity prices, (Figure 9).
11  Private sector wheat imports surged in the months 
                                                 
11 Import parity prices were in fact lower than shown in 1993 due to the U.S. Export Enhancement 
Program which subsidized wheat exports.   18 
 
immediately after the mid-1998 floods, averaging 111 thousand tons per month 
from September through December 1998.  Imports were again high from 
September through December 1999, (averaging 75 thousand tons per month), and 
totalled 1.611 million tons from July 1998 through June 2000. 
In 1999/2000, the private sector imported 806 thousand tons of wheat, and 
domestic wheat prices (national wholesale) averaged 8.64 Tk/kg.  In addition, 
public net distribution (total distribution less domestic procurement) added 813 
thousand tons of wheat to domestic supplies.  Thus, a total of 1.619 million tons of 
wheat was supplied to domestic markets through private imports and the PFDS in 
1999/2000.  Given that domestic prices remained close to estimated import parity 
prices for most of the year, and perhaps more important, that large amounts of 
wheat were imported by the private sector, it appears that food aid did not lead to 
price disincentive effects for Bangladesh wheat farmers in 1999/2000.   
After April 2000, however, national average domestic wheat prices fell to an 
average of 1.1 Tk/kg below estimated import parity levels.  Nonetheless, private 
sector imports remained high.  From April through June 2000, this was apparently 
due to imports of exceptionally low-priced wheat (about $130/MT C&F Chittagong) 
from the EU and Turkey.  Later in 2000, however, private market imports 
considerably slowed, suggesting that private imports of non-milling wheat may not 
have been profitable.   19 
 
 
5.  ESTIMATES OF THE SAFE LEVEL OF FOOD AID IN BANGLADESH 
 
Assessing the quantity of wheat that can be imported without depressing 
domestic prices below import parity and causing price disincentives on domestic 
production requires an analytical model of the wheat supply and demand in 
Bangladesh.  In this section, we provide quantitative estimates of these 
disincentive effects based on actual levels of supply, demand and prices in 
1999/2000 and 2000/01, updating and extending previous analyses by the Centre 
for International Economics (CIE, 1997) and Dorosh (2000).       
CIE (1997) used a basic short-run supply and demand framework to 
analyze the impacts of expanding food aid beyond the “safe” level.  This analysis 
did not estimate the “safe” level itself, however, but instead used three alternative 
assumptions regarding the market clearing levels of production, consumption and 
imports of rice and wheat.  Then, using alternative estimates of supply and 
demand parameters, they simulated the impact of an additional 100 thousand tons 
of food aid on the level of domestic wheat production.  The biggest impacts on 
production occurred with unresponsive (inelastic) demand parameters and 
response (elastic) supply parameters.  In this case, additional food aid beyond the 
“safe level” would increase total supply and depress market prices, but demand 
would increase only slightly and production would drop sharply.  Under various 
scenarios with these parameters, and additional 100 thousand tons of food aid 
resulted in a reduction of between 81 and 91 thousand tons of wheat production.   20 
 
Dorosh (2000) calculated the safe level of food aid for 1996/97 based on 
historical levels of production, food aid, private sector imports and prices, along 
with alternative assumptions regarding world prices and supply and demand 
elasticities (Table 6).  
 Even though the private sector imported 222 thousand tons of wheat in 
1996/97, wheat prices in Bangladesh in that year averaged only Tk/kg 8.99, 
significantly below import parity prices, estimated at Tk/kg 10.15.  This suggests 
that private sector imports were a different quality of wheat than domestically 
produced wheat.  However, the substantial difference between estimated import 
parity and domestic prices appears to be too large to be accounted for only by 
quality differences.
12  Thus, the data indicate that food aid (or more accurately, net 
domestic distribution made possible by food aid and government commercial 
imports), depressed prices below import parity.  Under free trade, total imports 
would have been only 710 thousand tons, compared to 933 thousand tons actually 
imported in 1996/97.  With lower prices, the free trade level of imports is higher, 
868 to 894 thousand tons at a world price of $/MT 197, and 770 to 839 thousand 
tons at a world price of $MT 208.  
 
 
Analytical Framework: A Simple Quantitative Model of the Wheat Market 
 
 
The drop in wheat market prices below import parity levels (based on U.S. 
hard red winter wheat prices adjusted for quality) in the second half of 2000 
                                                 
12 Erratic market conditions may have fooled some traders, as well.   21 
 
suggest that food aid (or more exactly net public foodgrain distribution)
13 may have 
had disincentive effects on domestic production.  This model is similar to those 
used in earlier studies, but uses an updated base scenario (1999/2000), and 
unlike CIE (1997) and Dorosh (2000), it explicitly takes into account differences in 
wheat quality and the impacts of changes in rice prices.   
The model determines domestic wheat prices, production, demand and 
private imports, given the international price of wheat and an exogenous domestic 
price of rice.
 14  Changes in domestic wheat demand are calculated using the base 
                                                 
13 Note that net distribution plus private imports is equivalent to total imports if there are no 
changes in government stocks.  The results from Dorosh (2000) shown above also assume no 
change in government stocks and show only total imports (not the breakdown between food aid, 
commercial imports and private imports).  
 
Determining the level of total imports is equivalent to determining net domestic distribution (NDD) 
plus private sector imports (M) when change in government stock (DST) is zero. 
   From the identity for change in government stocks, (and assuming no storage losses), 
 
     AID + GI + DP – DD = change in government stocks,  
 
where AID is food aid, GI is government commercial imports, DP is domestic procurement and DD 
is domestic distribution.  Defining net domestic distribution (NDD) as domestic distribution (DD) 
less domestic procurement (DP), and adding private sector imports (I) to both sides of equation (1), 
we have: 
 
     AID + GI + I = change in government stocks + NDD + I 
 
and total imports = NDD + I, when change in government stocks is zero. 
14 Since total wheat demand and supply in Bangladesh are small relative to rice (approximately 
21.3 million Tons of wheat compared to 3.3 million Tons of rice in 1999/2000), changes in wheat 
prices have only a minor impact on the price of rice.  Thus, keeping the price of rice exogenous is 
an appropriate simplifying assumption for analysis of changes in food aid.  Quantitative analysis of   22 
 
level of demand, changes in the prices of rice and wheat and the own-price 
elasticity of demand of wheat and the cross-price elasticity of demand for wheat 
with respect to the price of rice.
15  Similarly, changes in domestic wheat production 
are calculated using the base level of demand, changes in the prices of rice and 
wheat and the own-price elasticity of supply of wheat and the cross-price elasticity 
of supply for wheat with respect to the price of rice. 
Supply of food aid is added to domestic production (less a ten percent 
deduction for seed, feed and wastage) to get total supply.  In addition, in the 
simulations presented, private sector imports of milling wheat (360 thousand tons), 
which are assumed to be insensitive to the changes in wheat prices modeled here, 
are added to total supply.  The model then calculates a market- clearing price of 
wheat given total supply and demand for wheat in the absence of private sector 
imports for ordinary wheat.  If this price is below the import parity price, then this 
price represents the market price of wheat in Bangladesh.  If, however, the 
equilibrium price is above the import parity price, the model uses the import parity 
price to recalculate demand.  In this case, imports are determined as the 
difference between domestic supply and demand. 
                                                                                                                                                    
rice policy and broad food policy issues, however, require a model with an endogenous price of 
rice, wheat and other commodities as in Dorosh and Haggblade (1995, 1997). 
15 The own-price elasticity of demand for wheat is defined as the percentage change in wheat 
demand given a one percent change in the real price of wheat.  Similarly, the cross-price elasticity 
of demand for wheat with respect to the price of rice is defined as the percentage change in wheat 
demand given a one percent change in the real price of rice.   23 
 
 
Avoiding Prices Disincentive Effects: Empirical Estimates of the “Safe” Level of 
Food Aid 
 
 
Table 7 presents estimates of domestic wheat prices, production and 
private sector imports under scenarios of international wheat prices, domestic rice 
prices, and consumer and producer price responsiveness (as measured by 
demand and supply elasticities).  Given a base of 1999/2000, Scenario 1 models 
an increase in the import parity price of wheat (due to the exchange rate 
devaluation in mid-2000).  In this case, higher producer prices lead to a 2.0 
percent increase in domestic production, a 3.2 percent decline in domestic 
demand, reducing the overall net demand for privately imported or PFDS wheat 
(non-production net-supply) from 1.62 to 1.48 million tons.  Given an assumed 600 
thousand tons of food aid and a public net distribution of 917 thousand tons of 
wheat, private imports would be 563 thousand tons (1.480 million tons less 917 
thousand tons).  
An increase in international wheat prices (U.S. Hard Red Winter #2, FOB 
Gulf) to $155/MT (the average level of the previous five years) could reduce 
demand for privately imported or PFDS wheat to about 1.20 million tons, as 
domestic production increases and total demand declines (Scenario 2).   
The biggest potential impacts on wheat demand could come, however, from 
continued bumper crops of rice.  A reduction in the average wholesale price of rice   24 
 
from 12.0 Tk/kg to 10.5 Tk/kg
16 could reduce demand for privately imported or 
PFDS wheat to 1.24 million tons at 1999-2000 world wheat price level (Scenario 
4), or to about 940 thousand tons at the higher, five-year average world price level 
(Scenario 5).  Given that import demand for milling wheat is about 360 thousand 
tons per year, total demand for privately imported or PFDS ordinary wheat would 
be only about 580 thousand tons in the latter scenario.  Net PFDS distribution 
greater than this amount would drive domestic prices below import parity levels. 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Table 8 presents estimates of the “safe level” of food aid under alternative 
assumptions regarding, international wheat prices, price-responsiveness of wheat 
consumers and producers (as reflected in elasticities of wheat supply and 
demand), and domestic rice prices.  The higher the import parity price, the smaller 
the amount of net public distribution of wheat that can be distributed without 
depressing domestic wheat market prices below import parity.  For example, with 
a medium-level rice price of 12.24 Tk/kg (the average wholesale price in 
1999/2000), raising the import parity price of wheat from 9.2 to 12.2 Tk/kg reduces 
the “safe level” of food aid from 1.132 to 0.623 million tons (assuming inelastic 
supply and demand for wheat).  More elastic supply and demand parameters 
imply that changes in the import parity price have a larger effect on the total 
quantity of wheat import demand.  Thus, with a more elastic demand and supply, 
raising the import parity price from 9.2 to 12.2 Tk/kg reduces the “safe level” of 
                                                 
16 The national average nominal price of coarse rice at the wholesale level from July through   25 
 
food aid from 0.999 to 0.004 million tons.  Finally, as in Table 7, rice prices have a 
major impact on the “safe level” of food aid.  With low rice prices, wheat demand 
falls by about 200 thousand tons with inelastic parameters, and by 350 to 400 
thousand tons with elastic parameters.  
Table 8 also shows wheat price disincentive effects are easily possible in 
Bangladesh.  Net public wheat distribution on the order of 800 thousand tons (the 
figure was 813 thousand tons in 1999/2000) exceeds the “safe level” of food aid 
under all scenarios with low rice prices except that of low international prices and 
inelastic demand parameters.  Even with inelastic demand parameters, the “safe 
level” of net wheat public foodgrain distribution is only 838 thousand tons, only 25 
thousand tons more than actual distribution in 1999/2000, (a year, however, that 
had lower international wheat prices).   
Note that these figures are based on the distribution pattern of wheat in 
1999/2000, when 351 thousand tons of wheat were distributed through Food For 
Education, Vulnerable Group Development and Vulnerable Group Feeding, 
programs for which participants have a high marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) wheat out of transfers received.  Assuming an MPC for wheat of about 0.3 
in these programs (del Ninno and Dorosh, 2000), then these programs created an 
additional wheat demand of about 105 thousand tons.  If cuts in wheat distribution 
take place in these programs, this additional wheat demand will be lost, as well, 
with a potentially negative effect on domestic prices.   
Table 9 shows the size of the potential price disincentive effect of 600 and 
900 thousand tons of net public wheat distribution under alternative assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                    
December 2000 was 11.6 Tk/kg, and the average price in December 2000 was 11.9 Tk/kg.   26 
 
for rice prices and model parameters.  The prices shown in the table are the prices 
that result from the specified level of net public foodgrain distribution if private 
sector imports of non-milling wheat are zero.  In other words, these prices show 
the market clearing prices in the absence of private sector imports of non-milling 
wheat.   
With net PFDS wheat distribution of 900 thousand tons and medium-level 
rice prices, wheat prices in Bangladesh would be 10.44 Tk/kg in the absence of 
non-milling wheat imports by the private sector.  This price is 10.6 percent below 
long-term import parity of 11.67 Tk/kg (calculated using the average dollar price of 
U.S. Hard Red Winter #2 wheat over the 1995/96 – 1999/2000 period, adjusted for 
quality, transport and marketing costs).  If net PFDS wheat distribution were only 
600 thousand tons, then the market clearing price would be 12.32 Tk/kg, which 
would be above the long-term import parity price.   
With low rice prices, even 600 thousand tons of net PFDS wheat 
distribution is sufficient to bring down market-clearing prices to 11.0 Tk/kg, 5.8 
percent below long-term import parity.  Nine hundred thousand tons of net PFDS 
wheat distribution with low rice prices drops wheat prices to 9.31 Tk/kg, 20.3 
percent below long-term import parity.  Using more elastic demand parameters, 
the potential price disincentive effects are even larger, ranging from 12.1 to 27.3 
percent under the various scenarios.   
Thus, net PFDS wheat distribution of 900 thousand tons has small price 
disincentive effects on wheat production even with medium-level rice prices, and 
the disincentive effects are quite large (-20.3 percent) when domestic rice prices 
are low, as in 2000.  Reducing net PFDS wheat distribution to 600 thousand tons   27 
 
completely eliminates the price disincentive effect with medium-level rice prices 
(and inelastic parameters).  If the more elastic parameters are a better indication 
of medium-term supply and demand behavior, however, then there are still 
significant price disincentives, even with medium-level rice prices and only 600 
thousand tons of net wheat distribution.   
Reducing net PFDS wheat distribution from 900 to 600 thousand tons can 
be accomplished relatively easily by substituting domestic wheat procurement for 
commercial imports and stock drawdowns.  Cutbacks below 600 thousand tons, of 
course, imply a reduction in food aid.    28 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Over the past two decades, rapid expansion of green revolution technology 
in the form of small-scale irrigation, improved seeds and increased fertilizer use, 
have led to a rapid increase in rice and wheat production in Bangladesh.  Food 
grain harvests in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 reached record levels, eliminating the 
notional “food gap” and eliminating incentives for private sector imports of ordinary 
wheat and rice in much of Bangladesh.   
If these abundant harvests and low food grain prices persist, then continued 
large-scale distribution of food aid through the PFDS could result in disincentive 
effects.  In particular, the calculations presented in this paper show that if 
international wheat prices return to their average 1995-99 levels, then net public 
wheat distribution equal the 2000/2001 level of food aid received (650 thousand 
tons) would reduce domestic prices below import parity.  In this scenario, food aid 
donors might decide to reduce food aid flows to avoid price disincentive effects on 
Bangladesh wheat production.   
Cuts in food aid, however, could potentially cost Bangladesh millions of 
dollars per year in resources that currently provide the resources for programs that 
increase access to food by poor households.  A major loss of resources for food 
security need not occur in this scenario, though.  In place of the food aid imports, 
donors could provide the equivalent value of resources in the form of cash, either 
to permit the Government of Bangladesh to procure foodgrain locally for these 
programs or to use directly in re-designed Cash for Work or other cash programs.    29 
 
Continued good harvests depend on adequate funding of agricultural 
research and extension, maintaining appropriate price incentives for production, 
timely input supplies at reasonable prices, and the weather.  If these prerequisites 
are met, foodgrain availability targets are likely to be achieved and donors may 
reduce food aid to avoid causing price disincentives on production.  Even with 
abundant food grain availability, however, resources will continue to be required 
for programs that increase access to food by the poor, contribute to increased 
utilization of food and result in improved nutritional outcomes.  Thus, it is important 
that resources devoted for food security in Bangladesh not decrease, even if the 
need for food aid to increase availability of foodgrains diminishes.   30 
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Table 1.  Global Food Aid by Donor 
(in thousand tons) 
 
  1970’s  1980’s  1990’s 
 
 
Canada  876  848  544 
United States  5,824  6,217  5,586 
European Union  1,146  1,843  2,433 
Japan  297  535  487 
Australia  262  387  261 
Other Europe  162  211  590 
Other Donors  337  466  428 
All Donors  8,905  10,587  10,430 
 
 
Source:  FAO/INTERFEIS 
Note:      1970’s show data for 1971/72-1978/79 
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Table 2:  Global Food Aid Deliveries by Recipient Countries: 1990-1999 
                        (thousand tons) 
Year Angola Ethiopia  Mozamb.  Sudan  Egypt  Bangladesh  India 
DPR 
Korea  Pakistan Peru 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
Other 
Countries Total 
1990 124          864           423 
        
230 
     
1,066        1,050 
         
382            -            462 
       
359               -           8,191 
     
13,150 
1991 136          944           543 
        
550 
     
1,824        1,083 
         
250            -            358 
       
406                 0          6,723 
     
12,816 
1992 114       1,210        1,046 
        
706         617           976 
         
326            -            325 
       
563             165          9,395
     
15,277 
1993 174          534           458 
        
340         221           396 
         
390            -            211 
       
454             372        14,143 
     
17,319 
1994 344          949           379 
        
432         295        1,095 
         
360            -            140 
       
391             527          8,506 
     
12,891 
1995 220          636           386 
         
82         209           590 
         
398          545           119 
       
255             384          6,763 
     
10,201 
1996 251          457           151 
        
108         155           575 
         
359          510             54 
       
171             232          4,456 
       
7,247 
1997 181          434           176 
        
115           74           713 
         
300          915           182 
       
140             231          4,147 
       
7,377 
1998 203          595           201 
        
206           67           880 
         
331          786             58 
       
262             125          4,691 
       
8,278 
1999 134          914           119 
        
332           61        1,325 
         
348          994           449 
         
91             336          9,735 
     
14,501 
Average                         
1990-99 188          754           388 
        
310         459           868 
         
345          375           236 
       
309             237          7,675 
     
11,906 
Source: WFP/INTERFAIS                        
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Table 3.  Composition of Food Aid by Commodity 
       
(in million tons)
   1970's  1980's  1990's
Wheat and Wheat Flour  7.193 8.556 6.247
Coarse Grains  1.060 1.745 2.723
Other Cereals  1.906 1.687 1.535
Cereals, Total  10.160 11.988 10.506
Non Cereals  0.1711 0.928 1.365
Total Food Aid  10.330 12.916 11.871
 
Source: FAO/INTERFEI  
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Table 4.  Food Aid, Government Expenditures and Imports, 1977/78 - 1998/99 
     (Billion 2000 Taka)
Year  Food Aid  Total Aid 
Government 
Expenditure  Imports 
1978  10.2  72.2  122.8  122.0 
1979  14.1  81.2  141.4  129.4 
1980  26.3  85.7  166.2  170.8 
1981  12.1  71.3  146.6  161.3 
1982  15.5  83.4  153.6  175.7 
1983  18.2  83.8  153.6  164.3 
1984  19.4  89.2  167.2  165.5 
1985  16.2  83.5  163.0  174.0 
1986  14.1  91.0  175.1  164.7 
1987  15.1  106.6  184.8  175.1 
1988  18.0  98.5  180.2  179.3 
1989  12.5  92.1  185.7  186.3 
1990  9.4  90.8  195.1  188.5 
1991  12.9  83.5  181.5  167.3 
1992  12.0  80.0  196.0  172.0 
1993  5.9  81.4  215.0  197.8 
1994  5.6  74.6  201.8  200.7 
1995  6.5  82.2  245.1  275.6 
1996  6.5  68.3  251.1  325.5 
1997  4.9  71.5  266.5  345.7 
1998  4.8  61.0  290.0  367.0 
1999  8.8  76.2  302.2  397.8 
         
1980-84  18.3  82.7  157.4  167.5 
1985-89  15.2  94.3  177.8  175.9 
1990-94  9.2  82.1  197.9  185.3 
1995-99  6.3  71.8  271.0  342.3 
1980-99  12.2  82.7  201.0  217.7 
    Share of Food Aid   
1980-84  1.000  0.221  0.116  0.109 
1985-89  1.000  0.161  0.086  0.086 
1990-94  1.000  0.112  0.046  0.049 
1995-99  1.000  0.088  0.023  0.018 
1980-99  1.000  0.148  0.061  0.056 
 
Note: Real 2000 prices computed using the non-food consumer price index. 
Source: GOB data and authors' calculations.  
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Table 5.  Trends in Food Aid and PFDS Distribution 
                3 Year Moving Average 
Financial
Year 
(000 Tons) 
Rice Food 
Aid 
(000 Tons) 
Rice PFDS 
(000 Tons) 
Wheat Food 
Aid 
(000 Tons) 
Wheat 
PFDS 
(000 
Tons) 
Total 
PFDS 
Wheat 
PFDS-Food 
Aid 
Rice 
PFDS-Food 
Aid 
Wheat 
Food 
Aid 
Wheat 
PFDS-Food 
Aid 
Rice 
Food 
Aid 
Rice 
PFDS-Food 
Aid 
Total 
PFDS 
1975/76 395  517  919  1170  1687  251  122           
1976/77 111  798  552  693  1491  141  687  905  140  204  437  1,685 
1977/78 104  606  1244  1271  1877  27  502  951  122  89  570  1,731 
1978/79 50  571  1057  1255  1826  198  521  1212  209  60  567  2,048 
1979/80 24  702  1336  1738  2440  402  678  1008  333  64  532  1,937 
1980/81 119  515  632  1031  1546  399  396  1026  328  58  605  2,018 
1981/82 30  772  1111  1295  2067  184  742  863  392  93  501  1,849 
1982/83 131  496  845  1439  1935  594  365  1093  334  93  498  2,018 
1983/84 117  503  1324  1548  2051  224  386  1117  600  124  342  2,183 
1984/85 125  400  1181  2162  2562  981  275  1188  437  90  336  2,051 
1985/86 27  373  1060  1167  1540  107  346  1186  466  87  336  2,074 
1986/87 108  495  1317  1626  2121  309  387  1324  285  109  336  2,055 
1987/88 192  468  1595  2035  2503  440  276  1409  557  113  447  2,527 
1988/89 40  719  1316  2239  2958  923  679  1273  648  91  530  2,542 
1989/90 41  675  908  1489  2164  581  634  1251  458  30  758  2,498 
1990/91 10  971  1530  1401  2372  -129  961  1271  221  30  772  2,294 
1991/92 39  759  1375  1586  2345  211  720  1207  -12  23  713  1,930 
1992/93 19  476  716  597  1073  -119  457  915  155  19  509  1,598 
1993/94 0  350  654  1026  1376  372  350  768  187  6  379  1,341 
1994/95 0  329  935  1244  1573  309  329  775  382  0  424  1,581 
1995/96 1  593  737  1202  1795  465  592  760  273  4  550  1,587 
1996/97 10  739  608  653  1392  45  729  631  351  4  617  1,603 
1997/98 0  529  549  1092  1621  543  529  777  339  23  576  1,715 
1998/99 59  530  1174  1603  2135  429  471  863  377  21  624  1,885 
1999/00 5  876  865  1024  1900  159  872  876  389  34  670  1,969 
2000/01p 40  707  589  1167  1874  578  667  681  438  28  735  1,883 
2001/02p 40  707  589  1167  1874  578  667           
Source: Directorate of Food and NBR                   
Note:    Food aid only includes only grant               
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       Table 6.  Estimates of Wheat Imports in Absence of Food Aid, 1996/97 Base 
 
Domestic Price    World Price 
($/ton)  (Tk/kg)  (% Change) 
Wheat Imports 
(Thousand tons) 
Base 1996/97    221  8.99  0.0  933 
Free Trade  221  10.15  12.9  710 
Low World Price         
  Base 
  Parameters 
197  9.32  3.6  868 
  Inelastic  197  9.32  3.6  894 
Medium World Price         
  Base 
  Parameters 
208  9.81  9.1  773 
  Inelastic  208  9.81  9.1  839 
Notes:   Base parameters: wheat elasticity of supply (0.61), wheat elasticity of demand (-0.5). 
Inelastic parameters: wheat elasticity of supply (0.2), wheat elasticity of demand (-0.4). 
Source:  Dorosh (2000). 
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         Table 7.   Wheat Imports and Domestic Prices Under Alternative Scenarios 
          Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
         
 
 
Base 
1999-
2000 
2000/2001 
World Price 
(FOB 
$120/ton) 
Higher World 
Price (FOB 
$155/ton) 
Low Rice 
Price 
(11.2 Tk/kg) 
Low Rice Price 
High World 
Wheat 
Price (FOB 
$155/ton) 
Supply           
Production  1.840  1.877  1.975  1.927  2.020 
 Losses  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100 
 Less 10 Percent Losses   0.184  0.188  0.197  0.193  0.202 
Net Production  1.656  1.689  1.777  1.735  1.818 
Public Net Distribution  0.813  0.917  0.917  0.917  0.917 
Private Imports  0.806  0.563  0.217  0.327  0.019 
Total Supply  3.275  3.169  2.911  2.978  2.754 
  Total Imports  1.671  1.363  1.017  1.127  0.819 
  Non-production Net 
Supply  1.619  1.480  1.134  1.244  0.936 
           
PFDS           
Food Aid  0.865  0.600  0.600  0.600  0.600 
Govt Commercial Imports  0.000  0.200  0.200  0.200  0.200 
Domestic Procurement  0.211  0.250  0.250  0.250  0.250 
Offtake  1.024  1.167  1.167  1.167  1.167 
Stock Loss  0.018  0.017  0.017  0.017  0.017 
Change in Public Stocks  0.034  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134 
           
Demand           
Total Demand  3.275  3.169  2.911  2.978  2.754 
CIF Price of Wheat ($/MT)  162  162.00  197  162  194 
Exchange Rate (Taka/$)  50  54.00  54  54  54 
CIF price (Tk/kg)  8.10  8.75  10.64  8.75  10.48 
Handling, Transport (Tk/kg)  1.45  1.45  1.45  1.45  1.45 
Import Parity (Tk/kg)  9.55  10.20  12.09  10.20  11.93 
Quality Calibration factor  0.905  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90 
Domestic Wheat Price 
(Tk/kg)  8.64  9.23  10.94  9.23  10.79 
           
Percent Change Price    6.79  26.58  6.79  24.88 
Percent Change Production    1.99  7.33  4.74  9.78 
Percent Change Demand    -3.23  -11.12  -9.06  -15.91 
           
Elasticity of Supply of 
Wheat  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.30 
Elasticity of Demand of 
Wheat  -0.50  -0.50  -0.50  -0.50  -0.50 
Source:   Authors' calculations.           
Note:   Domestic price of wheat is national average wholesale price from DAM.      
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          Table 8.  Maximum Level of Net Wheat PFDS without Causing Wheat Producer  
                         Price Disincentives 
 
          International Wheat Price 
    162 $/ton   194 $/ton    222 $/ton 
    (9.2 Tk/kg)*   (10.8 Tk/kg)*  (12.2 Tk/kg)* 
             
Medium Rice Prices - 12.24 Tk/kg 
(2000)           
              
  Inelastic Parameters    1.132    0.838    0.623 
             
  Elastic Parameters    0.999    0.417    0.004 
             
             
Low Rice Prices - 11.2 Tk/kg (2000)           
             
  Inelastic Parameters    0.916    0.633    0.425 
             
  Elastic Parameters    0.589    0.045    -0.345 
                   
Source: Authors' calculations             
  * The international wheat price shown is the cost, insurance and freight price, Chittagong ($/ton), 
 U.S. HRW#2. 
Notes: These simulations assume inelastic demand for milling wheat imports of 360,000 Tons per year.   
Import parity prices include shipping and handling costs to wholesale Dhaka, adjusted with 0.905  
quality factor.  
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                Table 9.   Impact of Food Aid on Domestic Wheat Prices (Disincentive Effects) 
   
        Net PFDS Wheat Distribution   
          (thousand Tons)   
        600  900 
Medium Rice Prices - 12.24 Tk/kg (2000)       
                
  Inelastic Parameters      12.32Tk/kg  10.44Tk/kg 
        ***  -10.6% 
               
  Elastic Parameters      10.26Tk/kg  9.47Tk/kg 
        -12.1%  -18.9% 
               
               
Low Rice Prices - 11.2 
Tk/kg (2000)           
               
               
  Inelastic Parameters      11.00Tk/kg  9.310Tk/kg 
        -5.8%  -20.3% 
               
  Elastic Parameters      9.20Tk/kg  8.483Tk/kg 
            -21.2%  -27.3% 
Source: Authors' Calculation           
               
Notes: Wheat prices shown in the table are the prices which result from the specified level of 
net public foodgrain distribution if private sector imports of non-milling wheat are 
zero. Percentages shown indicate the percentage below a long-term import parity 
price of 11.67 Tk/kg. These simulations assume inelastic demand for milling wheat 
imports of 360,000 Tons per year.  
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                               Figure 1.  Bangladesh Foodgrain Gap, 1980/81 – 2000/2001 
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                     Figure 2.  World Food Aid by Donors 
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                             Figure 3.  Food Aid as a Percentage of Total Aid, Imports and Government Expenditure 
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                          Figure 4.  Food Aid to Bangladesh, 1980/81-2000/2001 
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                  Figure 5.  Food Aid and PFDS Distribution, 1976/77-2000/01 (3 Year Centered Moving Average) 
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                       Figure 6.  Channel-wise Distribution of Foodgrain from Public Stock 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001P
Year
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
T
a
r
g
e
t
e
d
 
N
o
n
-
S
a
l
e
s
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
O
M
S
,
 
F
a
i
r
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
C
a
r
d
 
S
a
l
e
s
O
t
h
e
r
 
R
a
t
i
o
n
 
S
a
l
e
s
  
 
 
47 
 
 
                       Figure 7.  Disincentive Effects of Food Aid 
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                            Figure 8.   Impact of Reduced Demand on Production, Prices, and Imports 
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                           Figure 9.   Wheat Prices and Quantity of Private Wheat Imports in Bangladesh, 1993-2001 
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